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IN THE SUPREl\fE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. L. CLOUD and HELEN CLOUD, his wife,
and SANDRA CLOUD, their daughter,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
E. S. ZIEGLER, Judge cf the Juvenile Court
at Ogden, Utah; CLAUD PRATT, Superintendent of the Utah State Industrial School
at Ogden, Utah and JUDY ROSS, an employee of the Children's Service S::ciety at
Ogden, Utah,
Defendants and Resp:ndents.

Case No.
11016

G. L. CLOUD and HELEN CLOUD, his w'.fe,
and SANDRA CLOUD, their daughter,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
REX ASHDOWN, Director of the Children's
Aid Society at Ogden, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant appeals from the denial of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court of
\Veber County.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
Hearing was held before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, on August 23, 1967, on the appellant's
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to discharge her
from the state industrial school and to release and discharge her child from the custody of the state welfare
department. The court denied appellant's petition for
release and continued the petition for discharge of the
baby until juvenile court proceedings had been com·
pleted. On November 21, 1967, the juvenile court permanently severed the parental control of the appellant
over the baby and the petition seeking discharge of the
infant was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests the judgment of the Lower
Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 1, 1966, appellant, Sandra
Fay Cloud, ran away from her home and was beyond
the control of her parents by staying out overnight,
refusing to obey the reasonable requests of her parents,
endangering her own welfare and the welfare of others
by drinking alcoholic beverages and engaging in sexual
relations with Gary Sigmon.
On the 25th day of October, 1966, Mrs. Helen
Cloud, Sandra Cloud's mother, was served with a sum·
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mons requiring her to appear in .Juvenile Court before
Judge Rcgnal W. Garff along with her husband and
daughter Sandra to determine the action to be take:1
against Sandra Cloud (J .R. 200636). On November
7, 1966, a hearing was held and attended by the appel.
lant and her parents, Mrs. Barbara Leibroder, a juvenile probation officer, and the librarian of the medical
records of the University of Utah hospital.
Sandra Cloud admitted the above allegations and
Judge Garff rendered his decision of December 12.
The decision committed Sandra to the State Industrial
School. Judge Garff suspended the commitment order
on condition that Sandra would voluntarily go to the
state hospital and receive medical attention (Findings
of Fact Case No. 36372.) Sandra admitted herself to
the state hospital, but on March 13, 1967, she endangered her own welfare by leaving the state hospital contrary to medical advice. She was brought back to
the Salt Lake County Detention Center. On March 25,
1967, a summons was served on Mrs. Helen Cloud to
appear with Sandra and Mr. Cloud on April 5, 1967.
At the hearing on that date the appellant was represented by an attorney at law, Mr. Leland Ford. Also
present at the hearing was Dr. Bernardo Garso, who
testified to the progress of appellant and the reasons
why she left the state hospital contrary to medical
advice. At this hearing, Judge Garff enforced the commitment of the appellant to the state industrial school.
On June 21, 1967, a baby boy was born to the
appellant at the Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital, Og-
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den, Utah. One day before the appellant's discharge
from the Dee .Memorial Hospital, a hearing was held
before Judge Ziegler which placed the infant boy in
the temporary custody of the Children's Aid Society
until the matter could come before the court at a late1·
date.
A hearing on the custody of the child was scheduled for August 8, I967, but was continued to September 5, I967, to allow the appellant, Sandra Cloud, ample
notice of the hearing. The matter was again continued
without decision to October IO, I967. The hearing com·
menced through October IO, I967, and included November 21 before the decision was rendered. The court
found Sandra lacked the necessary mental capacity to
adequately care for the needs of the child and that her
commitment to the state industrial school served as a
further deterrent to her proper care for the child.
(Record I00828 p. IO).
Pursuant to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10·
IOO ( 16) ( 1963), Judge Ziegler permanently termi·
nated all parental rights of the appellant Sandra Cloud
in her child and ordered the child placed for adoption
in accordance with Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55·
IO-I09(4)

(I963).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
App ELL ANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS \iVERE NOT VIOLATED DURING
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THE HEARING IN THE SECOND DISTRICT
JUVENILE COURT, BECAUSE OF THE APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF
COUNSEL IN THE FIRST HEARING AND
HER RETENTION OF COUNSEL AT THE
SECOND HEARING.
As to the appellant's contention that Sandra was
denied the services of counsel this allegation seems
untenable. At the time of the appellant's intial delinquency hearing, Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 85, 87
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 ( 1967), had not been
decided and the Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-1096 ( 1963) was controlling the procedure followed in
.Juvenile Court proceedings. The section required:
Parents, guardians, the child's .custodians, and
the child if old enough, shall be informed that
they have the right to be represented by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings. They have the
right to employ counsel of their own choosing,
and if any of them request an attorney and is
found by the court to be without sufficient financial means to employ an attorney, counsel shall
be appointed by the court.
The proceeding conducted on November 7, 1966,
in which the appellant was initially brought before
Judge Garff is not included in the record and therefore
in the absence of the record it is sufficient to assume
there was a regularity of the hearing at which the appellant received her constitutional rights and waived those
rights. Blaine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah2d 4, 347 P.2d 554
(1959) ; Ex parte Gutierrez, 122 Cal.App.2d 601, 265
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P.2d 16 ( 195.Ji) ; Ex parte Hynes, 84 Cal.App.2d 746,
191 P.2d 791 ( 1948) ; Ex parte Knight, 62 Cal.App.
2d .582, 144 P.2d 882 (1944).
At the supplemental hearing conducted on April
5, 1967, the record shows that the parents had retained
an attorney, l\fr. Leland Ford, to represent the interests
of the appellant and her parents. The lack of evidence
to indicate an irregularity at the November 7 hearing
and the presumption of regularity over the proceedings
seems to eliminate any claim of error the petitioner may
have. In fact, the absence of counsel at the first hearing
indicates that the appellant understood her constitutional right to counsel and that she had apparently
waived that right during the first hearing. This infer·
ence finds support in United States v. Haynes, 386
F.2d 375 (1967), where appellant at first had waived
his right to counsel and then during police interrogation
requested his right to obtain counsel. The court indicates that the presence in the mind of the accused of
his right to pass and then his subsequent move to obtain
counsel indicates an understanding of his constitutional
rights and a voluntary waiver of those rights.
If appellant chooses to attack the waiver as defec·
tive, she must bear the burden of proof to show that he
did not competently and intelligently waive his right
to the assistance of counsel, McGuffey v. Turner, 18
Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967); Johnson v. Zerbest,
304 U.S. 458 ( 1967). State t'. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14,
361 P.2d 509 (1961), establishes the test that:
6

In order to find a waiver defective there must
be evidence of fear or coercion, or any reason
why he was induced to waive his rights other than
he thought the course he took was for his best
good.
At no stage of the hearings is there shown to be
any of the above mentioned characteristics. Quite to
the contrary, there existed an atmosphere that was co·
operative, friendly and responsive to the needs and
concerns of the appellant and the violations she was
charged with.
Appellant contends that the Gault decision must be
interpreted to be retroactive and then claims that the
appellant was not given all of her constitutional rights.
This contention is lacking a basis in both law and logic.
The Ganlt decision, supra, has been held not to be
retroactive in several cases, State v. Hance, 2 Md.App.
162, 233 Atl.2d 326 (1967); Harnmer v. Maryland,
3 Md.App. 96, 238 Atl.2d 567 (1967); Johnson v.
State, 3 Md.App. 105, 238 Atl.2d 290 (1967).
The decision to permit or restrict retroactive application rests on numerous factors and has evolved over
a period of time. The constitution neither prohibits nor
requires retroactive application. The question of retroactive application requires the court to weigh the merits
and demerits of each case by looking to the prior history
of the rule in question, its purposes and effects, and
whether retroactive operation of the rule would extend
or retard its operation. The court must remember, the
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actual existence of the law prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial determination. Chicot County Drainage District v. Ba;rter

State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 ( 1940).

In determining the operational effect of the rule
the courts have weighed heavily the disruptive effect
on the administration of our criminal law created when
these new constitutional decisions have been handed
down. In Johnson v. State, supra, the court found that
retroactive application would seriously disrupt the
administration of our law and would require the release
of numerous persons found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards. The same reasoning applies in
this case. To hold that the Gault decision, supra, must
be held retroactive would seriously disrupt our juvenile
court administration and impose a tremendous burden
unnecessarily upon the courts of this state.
The Gault decision also laid out a test that there
be no violation of due process of law or fairness. In
contrasting the Gault decision with our case, there is
a marked difference. In the Gault case there was police
interrogation of appellant without counsel or the parents
being present at any time, there was no notification
given the parents of the custody of their child and no
actual confrontation or adequate notice to have an
attorney prepare his case. In this case the violation
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occurred October 2, 1966, and the hearing was on November 7, 1966. The appellant had waived her right
to counsel but secured counsel for the April 5 hearing
and adequate notice was given by the authorities. There
was no police custody or interrogation and there existed
a cooperative atmosphere between the parent, appellant
and the law concerned in the case. There is no room in
this case for appellant to argue that the fair and due
process called for in the Gault case was violated.
A case similar and directly in point is Ex parte
DeGrace, 425 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1968) where a 13
year old juvenile sought release from the state training
school in a habeas corpus proceeding urging that his
rights established by Gault were violated. Nicolas
De Grace was charged with drinking alcoholic beverages, spending an entire evening at a motel cabin and
he was later charged with drinking of alcoholic bever.
ages on March 11, 1966; that he had been consuming
alcohol for one year's time previously; that he had
been truant from school on several occasions and that
he was out of the control of his parents and was in need
of cure and treatment of the court.
On appeal before the Kansas City Court of Appeals,
the court held the original proceeding to be constitutionally adequate. In that proceeding the court held that
the statement made by the juvenile judge that "they
(the appellant and parents) were entitled to be represented by a lawyer if you so desire," was sufficient
a1lYice as to right of counsel, and the parents' refusal
9

of counsel in saying, "No, your honor, I think we can
carry on without counsel," was a valid waiver of the
right to counsel.
Notwithstanding the retroactivity issue, an application of the Gault standards demonstrate a failure
of the appellant to bring to this court facts which would
merit consideration under Gault.
B
Appellant contends that she was denied her rights
because she was not confronted by witnesses against
her or given the right of cross-examination of those
witnesses. This contention lacks merit. The record of
the second hearing shows that the appellant freely admitted the allegations against her. Once the appellant
admits to the truth of the allegation and it is apparent
from the record that the appellant knew and understood the allegations against her and there was an
absence of any force or coercion involved, the appellant is deemed to have waived her right to confrontation
and cross-examination. These rights have long been
recognized as ones that can be waived by appellants.
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Schick
v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (1948). Being
voluntary in nature and with no complaints about
paternal urgings and police grilling, such cooperation
with the law cannot be looked on as a denial of con·
stitutional rights. State v. Aiken, 73 'Vash. Dec.2d
305, 434 P.2d 10 (1967).
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In addition to her waiver the appellant was confronted by a witness against her interest at the supplemental hearing. Dr. Bernaldo Garso of the Utah State
Hospital testified about the progress made by appellant while she was at the hospital and that it was his
professional opinion the appellant should have continued her presence at the hospital. This witn~ss firmly
established that the appellant was not capable of caring
for a child because of her low mental capacity, and
that this appellant had left the hospital against medical
orders. At the end of the witness' testimony, appellant's
counsel declined the opportunity for cross-examination.
It is clear from these facts that the appellanfs constitutional rights were not violated.

c
In eliminating the appellant's claim that she was
not advised of her right to remain silent, one must
remember that the admission before Judge Garff was
Yoluntary. The Gault case, supra, affirms as a test a
high standard upon the prosecution to prove that t?e
admission was not given under circumstances of coer:..
cion, suggestion or ignorance of rights, or in adolescent
fantasy, fright or despair. In looking at the record arid
the cooperative manner in which the hearing was conducted, there is no evidence of any coercion, suggestion,
fantasy, fright or despair. The hearings were conducted
in the informal manner prescribed by the Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1963) and in the best
interests of the juvenile concerned.
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Appellant's contention that she did not have proper
notice is entirely unfounded. She was brought before
Judge Garff on November 7, 1966, after having received the summons, served by .Mrs. Liebroder, appellant's probation officer, on October 27, 1966, at the
Second District Juvenile Court Building. The presence
of the appellant and her parents at the November 7
hearing firmly establishes that she had proper notice.
The summons for the hearing on April 5, 1967,
was served to Mrs. Helen Cloud by a deputy sheriff
on March 25, 1967. On April 5 appellant and her parents
accompanied by their attorney, Mr. Leland Ford,
were present and at this time the appellant's former
commitment was reexamined and affirmed and she was
committed to the state industrial school.

POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT OF THE FIRST
DISTRICT IN OGDEN HAD THE AUTHORITY TO PLACE BABY BOY CLOUD OUT
FOR ADOPTION AFTER THE PROPER
HEARING AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS HAD BEEN PROPERLY
ADJUDICATED.
Hearings before both Judge Ziegler, who placed
the Baby Boy Cloud in custody of the Children's Aid
Society, and those before Judge 'Vahlquist, who finally
terminated the parental rights of appellant were both
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within the proper scope of authority granted to the juvenile courts. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-77
( 1963) lays out the exclusive original jursdiction of
the juvenile court to cover proceedings:
( 2) Concerning any child:
(a) who is neglected or dependent child as
defined by § 55-10-64.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-64 ( 17) ( 1963)
defines neglected as including:
( b) a child who lacks proper parental care by
reason of the fault or habits of the parents,
guardians or custodian.
The juvenile court, in considering the detention
of the appellant Sandra Cloud, plus the expert testimony indicating mental instability in this person, did
not abuse its discretion in terminating their parental
rights. The court in so doing acted within the scope
of the authority of the above statutes and acted in the
best interests of all concerned.
The juvenile court is given concurrent jurisdiction
with the district court over all adoption proceedings.
This concurrent right includes jurisdiction to appoint
a guardian for the child and to determine custody in a
habeas corpus proceeding. 1
A further examination of Utah statutes reveals
that the juvenile court also has the authority to commit
a child to the state industrial school or other similar
1 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-78 (1963).
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type institution, for varying terms of commitment or
it may appoint a public or private institution or agency
as guardian and further terminate all parental-child
relationships. 2 The statute also sets the standards for
termination to be the determination of whether parents
are unfit or incompetent as shown through conduct
or conditions which are seriously detrimental to the
child.3
In addition, the juvenile court acts have been construed to be interpreted as broadly and comprehen·
sively as is reasonable. In Deveraux v. Brown, 2 Utah
2d 334, 273 P.2d 185 (1954), this court held:
The juvenile court is given broad and c;ompre·
hensive latitude and discretion in determining
the custody of the child and its orders may range
from mere temporary custody pending an in·
vestiga ti on or hearing or to meet a temporary
emergency; to an order intended to permanently
deprive the parent of the custody of his child ~y
committing the child to the custody of a child
placement society to be placed with a family for
adoption without consent of the parent1i. State
In Interest of K.B., .................... , 7 Utah 2d 398,
326 P.2d 395 (1958).
CONCLUSION
The record clearly reflects that the appellant was
adequately advised of their rights to be represented by
0

2 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-100 (1963).
3 Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-109 (1963).
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an attorney and intelligently and effectively waived
their right to counsel.
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings she was
committed to the industrial school and her infant child
was permanently taken from her and placed for adoption after the proper procedures were followed.
Examination of the record shows that the appellant
did not sustain her burden of proving the allegations
upon which her petition was based.
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial
court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus should be
affirmed and that the trial court findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD S. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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